Zero Tolerance for the Industrial Past and Other Threats: Policing and Urban Entrepreneurialism in Britain and Germany

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Summary. Recent years have witnessed changes in the discourses and practices of urban policing towards ‘quality-of-life offences’ and the presence of unwanted groups (beggars, drug-users) in city centres. The authors argue that the change towards a more ‘law-and-order’ style of law enforcement, often referred to as Zero Tolerance Policing, has to be examined not solely as a means of crime prevention but also in the context of interurban competition. Thus, it constitutes a moment of the urban political economy, often referred to as urban entrepreneurialism: especially for old industrial cities, safe and clean city centres are regarded as a necessary asset for competition and image promotion. These arguments are developed by discussion of two empirical studies: Glasgow, Scotland, and Essen, in the Ruhr region in Germany.

1. Urban Entrepreneurialism as a Basis for Crime Prevention

“Aggressive beggars are driving shoppers away”, proclaimed a Glasgow newspaper (Nicoll, 2001) in an article on the influential Lockwood Report (Lockwood, 2001) which commented unfavourably on Glasgow’s newly regenerated city centre in relation to begging and drug-taking. The message reads as follows: a particular activity (begging) becomes an offence (by being defined as aggressive, it constitutes a breach of the peace) and results in a response whereby users (of a particular kind, i.e. shoppers) vacate the city centre to shop elsewhere. In doing so, the reaction of consumers renders attempts to create attractive city centres in vain. Almost immediately, the argument calls for a response: end the aggressive begging! Deal with beggars so that they do not disturb shoppers! Drive them out, not the shoppers!

The link constructed in the argument is well-known to practitioners of urban regeneration: concerns about personal safety and fear of crime seem increasingly to determine the success of retail and leisure-based city-centre regeneration and thereby come to bear on a city centre’s success in national benchmarking exercises and interurban competition (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; Oc and Tiesdell, 1997; Christopherson, 1994;
Body-Gendrot, 2000). Such concerns are then commonly connected to a particular response in the policing of the problem, commonly known as Zero Tolerance Policing (ZTP).

A study of how ZTP has been taken up in Britain and Germany as a response to the demands of a restructuring in urban political economies, linked to the requirement for a competitive city, and becoming increasingly focused on city centres, lies at the heart of this article. The aim is to frame the argumentative connections found for pursuing ZTP within an entrepreneurial concept of urban governance. The rise of urban entrepreneurialism in urban political economies (Harvey, 1989a, 1989b; Hall and Hubbard, 1996), which has emerged over the past 20 years as a particular way of urban governance, has been widely discussed. Its major aim is to succeed in the accelerating trend of interurban competition and to attract investment, consumers, control functions and state grants to specific urban economies (Harvey, 1989b). Within this changing framework, marketing and image politics have gained importance in order “to build a physical and social imaginary of cities suited for that competitive purpose” (Harvey, 1989b, p. 14). Focusing on the problems faced by old industrial cities and regions in this respect, Paddison outlines the particular necessity on their part to embark on extensive image campaigns:

It is in those places in which economic restructuring is the more pressing task—areas which have sustained substantial erosion of their inherited economic base—that the repositioning of place becomes the more urgent (Paddison, 1999, p. 115; see also Kearns and Philo, 1993, and Gold and Ward, 1994).

However widely discussed the phenomenon of urban entrepreneurialism may be, the specific connections made between interurban competition and crime prevention strategies are much less familiar. There exist two strands of literature which touch upon the intersection of urban entrepreneurialism, as a particular form of urban political economy, and ZTP, as a particular style of policing and crime prevention. Although differing in their political positioning, both seem to take for granted that this connection is actually made by the agents involved. Furthermore, they do not explore the policy-making and implementation processes in depth. Instead, they rely on the discursive framing in terms of ZTP—as in the newspaper article quoted above—and are in danger of treating the discursive link as a given fact of urban politics.

Well-known to an urban studies audience are the arguments put forward by North American authors such as Mike Davis (in particular, Davis, 1991, 1998) and Sharon Zukin (1991), as well as others (Sorkin, 1992), on the general theme of law-and-order extension and intensification as part of building the post-modern (US) city. In particular, attention has been paid here to the privatisation of public space (Christopherson, 1994; for the UK, see Fyfe and Bannister, 1998).

A particularly useful approach is provided by Neil Smith’s concept of the ‘revanchist city’ (Smith, 1996, 1998) which focuses on the interrelationship between urban restructuring within interurban competition and its accompanying ideology of ‘revanchism’, which “blends revenge with reaction” (Smith, 1998, p. 1). This revanchism claims that the city has been stolen from the White middle class by all sorts of minorities (Smith, 1996, pp. 210–232; Smith, 1998). Within both the ideology and practice of this type of revanchism, “crime … has become a central marker” (Smith, 1996, p. 213) as it legitimises a crack-down on the poor who are now treated as criminals and made responsible for social and economic problems rather than being treated as the victims of socioeconomic restructuring.

At the other end of the scale, a large number of publications exist either to evaluate existing policies or to provide ‘best practice’ policy guidance (Home Office, 1994; Crime Concern et al., 1999). Oc and Tiesdell (1997, p. 20) argue from such a perspective when they emphasise the need to create safe city centres in order to make them attractive so that they can compete with other parts of
the same cities, as well as with other cities. In this literature, the demand for a clean and safe city centre is almost beyond any need for justification. The official literature on CCTV has hence been especially criticised for being too narrowly constructed and biased (Short and Ditton, 1995) and, consequently, it has done much to depoliticise the debates surrounding public space CCTV surveillance (Coleman and Sim, 1998).

Although only brief, the above discussion of existing literature has opened a gap for closer investigation into the practices and politics at the nexus of urban entrepreneurialism and ZTP. Here, this article addresses the question of how agents of economic regeneration employ the discursive connections so commonly made between city-centre regeneration, quality-of-life offences and ZTP, and combine them with street-level practices. In order to do so, it examines how Reeve (1998) lays out the impetus for increasing CCTV surveillance and the ‘panopticisation’ of city centres as simply the securing of high profits for the retail and leisure industries. He identifies as key agents for this process town and city-centre management institutions which have now been established in over 300 British cities and towns. Here, the process of establishing public–private partnerships, such as local economic development agencies or city-centre management partnerships, to manage the city is indicative of how the politics of city-centre regeneration are now operating. This shift in urban governance, which places non-elected quangos at the centre of economic regeneration and city-centre management, has facilitated many of the changes towards entrepreneurial management approaches which rely on crime prevention and policing strategies such as ZTP (Coleman and Sim, 1998; Newburn, 2001). These recent changes in governance reinforce arguments put forward by Mair (1986) that the expulsion of homeless and beggars is indeed vital for the success of the post-industrial city and to its business community. He contends that, due to the commodification of the post-industrial city, the realisation of its value remains uncertain and hence depends on heavy marketing but that “clearly the presence of [homeless people] would make marketing the post-industrial city substantially more difficult” (Mair, 1986, p. 362).

From this overview, a more detailed introduction of ZTP is appropriate to introduce crime prevention politics to a wider audience in the field of urban studies.

2. Discourse and Practice of Zero-tolerance Policing World-wide

Zero-tolerance policing was first applied in New York throughout the 1990s (for critical overviews, see Smith, 1998; Greene, 1999; Ortner et al., 1998). The new policing strategy has seemed to be a success story and an export ‘hit’ and, since the mid 1990s, similar approaches have been adopted in cities throughout the world (for examples, see Wacquant, 2000, p. 21). To be sure, the widespread utilisation of the rhetoric of ‘zero tolerance’ does not mean that the policing strategies in all of these cities are identical. However, “it is precisely this ‘flexible’ quality which has made a partial contribution to the popularity of the ZTP perspective” (Innes, 1999, p. 397). By calling them ‘zero tolerance’, many different initiatives are discursively linked to the ‘New York success story’ and the term has thus become a strong ideological tool.

At the ‘street level’ of policing practices, ZTP has at its core the idea of punishing even the slightest forms of public misconduct such as drinking in public, begging, vandalism, graffiti, dropping litter, or simply loitering. As a result of this, new offences and unwanted activities (often referred to as ‘quality-of-life-offences’) are discovered and become subject to policing and regulative practices. The measures applied, such as curfews, area bans, frequent ‘stop and search’ by the police and video surveillance, all attempt to displace and, in effect, evict certain undesirable people from certain areas.

The idea behind this approach is the ‘broken windows’ thesis, published by the con-
servative criminologists Wilson and Kelling in 1982 (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). The central claim of their concept is that, in those areas where physical signs of decay prevail and are not acted upon, criminal behaviour will grow and become dominant. It is thus important to focus on low-level public order offences, ‘incivilities’ of all kinds that contribute to the physical decay of a local environment—such as vandalism, graffiti and broken windows. This focus is regarded as the answer to the public’s fear of crime and is supposed to strengthen community ties. At this point, if not earlier, it should become clear that this type of crime prevention is not only about crime. Many of the targeted activities are not even offences; most of them are certainly not crimes. ZTP is, in the widest sense, about establishing a new morality by referring to the ‘good community’ and it thereby attempts to engineer behaviour and social norms. However, while the authors of the broken windows thesis display a theoretical attempt to link questions of crime, fear of crime, community and informal social control into a coherent framework—much in the manner of the Chicago school (Hermann and Laue, 2001)—the reception of the thesis and its most famous application in public and policy debates focuses on one very simple message

‘New York’ and ‘broken windows’ have become symbols in the field of the politics of crime which, beyond their actual origin, stand for a tougher way of coping with petty criminals and against rehabilitation as a leitmotiv (Walter, 1998, p. 359).

2.1 ZTP in Germany and the UK

In Germany, ZTP’s rise to popularity can be accurately dated to the 1997 cover of Der Spiegel (Darnstädt, 1997), Germany’s largest weekly news magazine, entitled “Against crime, drugs and dirt in German cities. Cleaning up like in New York?” This message was illustrated by a picture of the Statue of Liberty with a broom instead of the torch and equipped with handcuffs, walkie-talkie, truncheon and a gun. Shortly afterwards, the former Police Commissioner of the New York Police Department and ‘father’ of the success story, Bill Bratton, was invited to several German cities and heralded by Bild, Germany’s largest tabloid paper, as “the American super cop who made New York, this stronghold of violence, safe” (Röbel, 1997). ‘Zero tolerance’ was translated as ‘Null Toleranz’ and quickly became established in the debates on crime among conservative politicians as well as in the media. With the rise of this discourse, German politicians and police leaders started to visit the ‘big apple’ in order to get “Coaching in New York”, as Focus, Germany’s second weekly news magazine, entitled a story about the visit of the mayor of Frankfurt (Zorn, 1997). Beginning at the same time, police officials such as Schenk (1997) and academics such as the contributors to Dreher and Feltes (1997) began to question the effectiveness of ZTP and, especially, its transferability into a German context.

Also in 1997, Bratton was invited to Britain “to explain ‘zero tolerance’ in a press conference disguised as a colloquium” (Wacquant, 2000, p. 43). The results of this ‘press conference’ were published under the title Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (Dennis, 1997a). However, it is important to note that zero tolerance is less called upon under that name in a British context, as then Chief Constable John Orr, of Strathclyde Police Force which also covers Glasgow, pointed out in relation to Strathclyde Police’s Spotlight initiative (Orr, 1997). Or, as Dennis put it in the editor’s introduction to the above-mentioned book”, the term ‘zero tolerance’ is an unfortunate one” (Dennis, 1997b, p. 1). Yet, when it comes to the content, he too stresses the virtues of a policing style “down to the lowest level of sub-criminal, quality-of-life, offences” (p. 1). Concerning this ambiguity in the adoption of the term ‘zero tolerance’, Innes (1999) points to the development of community policing as a response to the 1980s inner-city riots in Britain, which were then partly blamed on...
heavy-handed policing (Scarman, 1981). The predominant rhetoric of ‘community policing’ explains “the fact that enthusiasm for ZTP has been more muted in parts of the police organisation” (Innes, 1999, p. 405) in Britain (Pollard, 1998). In practice, only a few police forces, namely Cleveland and London, have adopted that terminology. The most infamous ZTP example was the ‘Operation Zero Tolerance’ run by the Metropolitan Police in the King’s Cross area in London in late 1996, which received great media attention (Innes, 1999, p. 400). But although the term is not as widespread, various initiatives of police forces, such as the Strathclyde Police Force’s Spotlight initiative or the Home Office programme on Safer Cities (Home Office, 1988), have nonetheless largely been driven by similar assumptions and solutions.

In Germany as well as in the UK, the term ‘zero tolerance’ has indeed found its way into the public debates. Thus, although not each and every initiative in the vast field of crime prevention is rooted in its logic, ZTP has become a strong ideology as well as a guideline for the development of urban policing in both national contexts. Yet, to assume that German and British officials only copy their New York colleagues would be too simplistic. The reality of policing discourse and practice is more complicated. First, as an ideology, the label ‘zero tolerance’ is often applied to all kinds of initiatives which do not necessarily have much in common with New York. In Germany, for example, politicians of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) often use the term ‘Null Toleranz’ in the field of immigration policies. Secondly, as a guideline for policing practices, the basic assumptions of ZTP are often at work despite the term ‘zero tolerance’ not being used. This is especially true for strategies under the label ‘community policing’ (in Germany usually translated as ‘Kommunale Kriminalprävention’, meaning ‘communal crime prevention’), which also focus on ‘quality-of-life’ concerns and are aimed at a “regimentation of questions of conduct, politeness, good taste, cleanliness and lifestyle” (Frehsee, 2000, p. 66).

In discussing the recent development of policing in Essen and Glasgow, this article will show the extent to which the basic ideas of ZTP—fighting ‘quality-of-life offences’ and evicting unwanted individuals and groups—can be found even if the term ‘zero tolerance’ is not explicitly applied. It will especially focus on how the policies adopted here are linked to questions of urban entrepreneurialism and image production. With this focus, it is contended that current policing approaches are significantly influenced by concerns of aesthetics and image. These concerns are not only directed at homeless, youth and other ‘not-consuming publics’ but they also construct these as out of place and out of time. In this sense, they are as much a threat to economic regeneration as is the industrial past in the view of urban entrepreneurs, marketers and developers.

2.2 The National Scale

Before turning to the case studies, the paper will briefly outline the development of crime politics at the national scale in both Germany and the UK. This is necessary for two reasons: First, the national politics of crime frame their equivalents at the local scale. Secondly, the national scale also acts as the initiator for the local scale through legislative frameworks and national programmes.

First, notwithstanding debates on the ‘hollowing-out of the nation-state’ (Jessop, 1994) and neo-liberal rhetoric and politics of ‘less state’, quite the opposite can be observed with regard to the politics of crime (Hirsch, 1998; Wacquant, 1997). In Western capitalist societies, the state is still—and, in certain respects, more than ever before—the only legitimate monopolist of power (Hansen, 1999). The literature on recent developments in criminal law and law enforcement in the Western world shows a dominant trend towards more ‘law-and-order’ approaches (Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2000; Christie, 2000). Most obvious in this respect is that the
US is now marked by exploding incarceration rates, increasing expenditures on law enforcement and the move towards ZTP (Chambliss, 1999; Parenti, 1999). As for Germany and the UK, the situation is less dramatic, but developments are arguably heading in the same direction. (For Germany, see Müller-Heidelberg et al., 2001; Roggan, 2000; Hirsch, 1998. For Britain, see Garland, 2001; Bode and Lutz, 2001; Brownlee, 1998.) The results are a tighter criminal law, increasing powers for the police and growing budgets for crime policies. This national context enlarges substantially the possibilities for the establishment of ZTP approaches at the urban scale.

Secondly, the implementation of new forms of ZTP-style co-operation at the local scale is in large part an initiative deriving from the national scale. In England and Wales, cities and towns, since the passing of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), have been obliged to form ‘community safety partnerships’, where problems of disorder are to be addressed. In Germany, where questions of policing are decided on the scale of the 16 federal states (Länder), various forms of encouraging or implementing new local co-operation can be observed in different Länder. The most important examples include the ‘pilot project local crime prevention’ (Pilotprojekt Kommunale Kriminalprävention) in Baden-Württemberg, begun in 1993 (Feltes, 1995), and the ‘partnerships for order and security in cities and communities’ (Ordnungspartnerschaften für mehr Sicherheit und Ordnung in Städten und Gemeinden) in North-Rhine Westphalia since 1997 (Innenministerium, 1999; Kant and Pütter, 1998). In recent years, the German national state has also been increasingly involved in this process. In 1998, the Ministry of the Interior began to draw in the Federal Border Police (BGS) in major cities to patrol city centres alongside their local colleagues (Kant and Pütter, 1998). All local partnerships focus on the prevention and prosecution of minor offences of the ‘quality-of-life’ type mentioned above, with the nation-state still taking care of more serious crimes. This rescaling in the politics of crime prevention is to a large extent a national initiative.

Having outlined in the introduction the discursive link between urban entrepreneurialism and ZTP as consisting of an initially straightforward assertion that crime and fear of crime are bad for business in the city centre and therefore a significant obstacle for successful interurban competition, the paper now moves on to examine the politics of crime in two cities. For this, two former industrial cities have been chosen: Glasgow in the Central Belt of Scotland and Essen in the German Ruhr region. Both have been selected as the urban cores of old industrial regions which from the 1970s have undergone severe economic change, during which both had embarked on entrepreneurial strategies of place-marketing and reimagining. The central interest for the empirical investigation lies in the question of how agents in the respective cities place their solutions of problems of crime in the context of discourses of place-marketing, image politics and the competitiveness of cities and regions.3 For this, it is important to keep in mind how urban governance has been subjected to changes precisely by an urban entrepreneurial approach, bringing in new agents in various guises of public–private partnerships. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which the more specific discourses of crime prevention and law and order relate to a shift in practices at the street level by which secure city centres are produced.

3. Essen

3.1 Economic and Political Basis

Essen is located in the southern centre of the Ruhr region and, with slightly under 600,000 inhabitants (31 December 1999), it is its largest city. Its economic structure was traditionally dominated by the coal and steel industry, and especially by the famous ‘steel-baron’ Krupp, whose fate, since the mid 19th century, has been closely linked to the fate of the city: “‘Krupp and Essen’ were for 150 years synonyms” (Geographische Gesellschaft, 1990, p. 173). Unlike the rest of
the Ruhr region, where steel production was a growth industry until the mid 1970s, it came to an abrupt end after 1945 in Essen when the mills were dismantled and steel production was forbidden by the Western allies in this former centre of the German military industry (Mohaupt, 1991, p. 245). Essen remained, however, one of the world’s most important mining towns well into the 1950s, with 23 coal mines and almost 700 000 inhabitants in 1956. From 1958 onwards, the coal industry at the Ruhr went into crisis. After a long demise, the last mine in Essen was closed in 1986 and the coal industry came to an end in 1993.

As in many old industrialised regions, the vanishing of the industrial base in the Ruhr region was not compensated by the rise of a new service sector, resulting in higher than average unemployment rates (Kilper et al., 1996, p. 104). The proportion employed in the service sector rose to slightly over 70 per cent in 1997, as opposed to a mere 43 per cent in 1961, but, as can be seen in Figure 1, the unemployment rates of Essen and the Ruhr region have been higher than those of both the federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia (in which the Ruhr region is located) and western Germany as a whole from the mid 1970s onwards.

Essen has progressed further towards a service-sector-based economy than other Ruhr cities because its concentration on coal and steel industries was always less complete (especially in the northern Emscher zone; Kilper et al., 1996). Essen began to establish itself as the major shopping and retail centre of the region as early as the 1920s, with the first pedestrian precinct in Germany being opened there in the late 1950s (Mohaupt, 1991, p. 262). Furthermore, Essen has never been the location of mere production sites since corporate control functions have always been important and still are today. The headquarters of 11 out of the 100 largest German corporations are located in Essen.

The dependency on coal and steel is not the only reason for the economic crisis in the
Ruhr region. Ever since empirical research has shown that regional economic structures cannot sufficiently explain the differences in employment and economic success between regions (Grabher, 1993, pp. 256–260; Läpple, 1994, pp. 38–41), explanations for their different economic fates have increasingly incorporated social and cultural factors (Piore and Sable, 1984; Storper and Scott, 1989). In this context of recent regional research on industrial districts, innovative milieus, networks and regional modes of regulation, the “quasi-immaterial legacy of the coal and steel complex” (Kilper et al., 1996, p. 33) in the Ruhr region was identified as a ‘sclerotic milieu’ (Läpple, 1994). It is usually described as consisting of “symbiotic relations between the politico-administrative system and industry” (Grabher, 1993, p. 264) with close formal and informal ties between large vertically integrated corporations (such as Krupp), conservative local social democrats (SPD) and conservative local unions. This “cartel mentality” (Läpple, 1994, p. 46) included “basic patterns of thinking and action” (Kruse, 1992, p. 16), which led to the status quo being clung to and a mentality that prevented a reorganisation of the regional economy in an early period of decline, when the region was still well equipped with resources for innovation (Grabher, 1993, p. 262).

Essen, too, used to be a traditional stronghold of the SPD which, since the 1960s, held the absolute majority in the local council. This changed only in September 1999, when the Conservatives (CDU) won the local elections and now provide the mayor.

3.2 New Urban Politics and Image

Because of the ‘sclerotic milieu’ described above, political reactions to the crisis in the coal and steel industry took their time. It was not until several steel mills closed in 1987 and the subsequent strikes and protests that a clear rupture in industrial politics took place (Danielzyk, 1992, p. 90). In the following years, these conflicts put the social-democrats of North-Rhine Westphalia into a political and conceptual crisis and distressed the hegemony of the coal and steel industrial complex in the Ruhr region (Wissen, 2001, p. 7).

Beginning in the late 1980s, a series of new programmes aiming at structural change in the Ruhr region were initiated by the Land of North-Rhine Westphalia. These programmes differed substantially from their predecessors in that they focused on processes of networking at the regional and local levels, breaking up the traditional milieus. This is why some commentators have labelled them post-Fordist regional policies (Danielzyk, 1992; Wissen, 2001). In recent years, new forms of co-operative planning have also been experimented with throughout various planning events in Essen (Pommeranz, 2000).

Image politics are an important part of this new politics. The industrial past of the Ruhr region is not only virulent because of the manifest economic and social problems still originating from it, but also because it lives on in the image of the region. The image of an ‘old industrial’ region, where the air is filled with ashes and dust (which was true in the past, but is not true today), figures in the perception of the region from the outside as well as from the inside (Aring et al., 1989, p. 154). Within the region, according to Lindner (1993, p. 190), ‘shame’ about the industrial past is the dominant attitude, especially on the part of the political class (Aring et al., 1989; Pankoke, 1993). To get rid of this image has been and remains one of the most important tasks for the regional political élites. In Essen, this strategy seems to be successful. According to an opinion poll conducted in 1998, only 14 per cent of its inhabitants think that ‘classic industrial city’ is an adequate description of their city (EMG, 1998). However, the success of the image production in terms of perception outside Essen seems to be limited. In a recent survey conducted by the weekly magazine Focus, “economic, research and cultural experts” (Matthes et al., 2000, p. 280) were questioned to evaluate the image of the 12
largest German cities. Although ranked sixth among Germany’s 83 largest cities according to an index of economic strength and quality of life in the same article (p. 272), Essen ended up second-last in the image ranking, with only Duisburg, another Ruhr city, being less attractive.

### 3.3 Politics of Crime Prevention

Recent developments in the field of crime prevention in Essen are marked by a confusing variety of newly founded working groups in which a wide range of actors is involved. Here, some examples will be given which are typical of the situation in one way or another. One suitable example is the case of the central railway station, where, at the rear entry, an illegal but locally well-known open-air ‘drug market’ is located (Breyvogel, 1998b). According to a city-wide criminological survey conducted in 1996, 40 per cent of the people questioned feel insecure there at night, which makes it by far the most ‘insecure’ place in the city (Waeter et al., 1996, p. 63). In early 2000, there were five different round tables, working groups and the like, with different names and resulting from different initiatives on different scales, all dealing with the drug problem at the central railway station. Although the majority of the actors participated in all of these initiatives, the initiatives arguably showed very little practical result. One of our interview partners indicated that it was evident that the main reason for the actors participating in all of these initiatives was to block everything that might be against their own specific interest.

Thus the example shows that the mere existence of a variety of initiatives dealing with questions of crime prevention does not necessarily mean that anything concrete happens. This contrasts with both the praise heaped onto the numerous new initiatives on the one hand and, on the other hand, the fear of many critics that by participating in such initiatives all sorts of actors will be mobilised to legitimise new law-and-order approaches. Or, more theoretically speaking, discourse and ideology are not identical with (political) praxis. As Garland put it, aiming at a Foucauldian analysis of social control,

the analysis of strategies and technologies of power must always be accompanied by an analysis of the politics of their exercise (Garland, 1996, p. 462).

Another interesting aspect of the various working groups is that the representation of private capital (and its lobby organisations) is rather weak. Among the participants at the ‘initiative meeting’, initiating a new task force to deal with the railway station, only 5 out of the 53 delegates were, in a wider sense, speaking for the business community in the city. Two of them, from local public transport (EVAG) and the local branch of the national railway company, the owner of the main railway station, came from semi-public organisations; two more represented the local city marketing company (EMG); and only one, the spokesperson of the local retailers’ association, was a representative of local private capital itself.

This contrasts sharply with the perception of the interviewees and other observers (Hermann, 1999, p. 72) that the main reason why city-centre ‘crime’ is on the agenda in Essen is the constant complaints of the retailers and other representatives of local private capital. One of the few examples for these complaints occurred in 1999 when 120 retailers publicly demanded the eviction of an illegal drug and prostitution scene from one city-centre street, arguing that “because of the massive presence of prostitution, pimping and drug trade in the city centre, our customers cannot go shopping unimpeded” (quoted in Hermann, 1999, p. 66).

A survey among retail traders in North-Rhine Westphalia conducted in 1997 came to a similar conclusion. ‘Socially undesirable conduct’ was regarded as a big problem, with graffiti (43 per cent), drug-related activities (42 per cent) and aggressive begging (37 per cent) being the most important (Innenministerium, 1999, p. 57). In all this, it seems that the retailers can link their economic success or failure directly to issues of ‘crime’: undesirable appearances have to be evicted from
around their shops and are thus criminalised. Yet, as has been seen, retailers and local capital are not all that active when it comes to the practical side: the development of concrete strategies for urban regeneration and crime prevention.

The linkage between ‘crime’ and ‘cleanliness’ and the urban economy is present especially in the publications of, and in the authors’ interviews with, the Essen Marketing Gesellschaft (EMG), the local city marketing company which is a 50–50 public–private partnership. As one official puts it in the opening sentence of an article: “Cleanliness and security significantly influence the quality of a particular place’s competitiveness” (Book, 1998, p. 44). The same view was put forward in an interview with two officials of the EMG, who are involved in various activities of crime prevention and cleaning up the city. Questioned why they think this linkage is important, they emphasised the attraction of both customers and investors from the service sector (especially IT).

However, again, at a concrete level, the work of the EMG is far from being a success story, as the fate of their two biggest initiatives in the field of ‘security’ shows. First, the project of a ‘city service team’, a group of uniformed, formerly unemployed people, whose job it was to provide help for visitors, a source of information for the Town Clerks’ Office about unclean areas and reduction of ‘fear of crime’ through social control, ended after two years. The main reason was the difficulty in finding adequate people who would do this very low-paid job, which was part of the national programme Arbeit statt Sozialhilfe, a German version of workfare. Secondly, the ‘City Centre Roundtable’, one of the numerous working groups in the field, in which only the highest-ranking officials of the administration, the police, the local retailers’ organisation and different social work organisations (statutory and voluntary) participated, also dissolved in 1999.

So the interests of local city marketing in the eviction of undesirable groups from the city centre, and thus in the topic of ‘crime’, are directly derived from their interest in the economic success of the city. Although the new level of interurban competition since the early 1970s (Harvey, 1989a) may well have intensified this interest, it is far from being new. Klee (1979, p. 68), for example, shows how the Deutsche Städtetag, the lobby organisation of German cities, in 1977 started an initiative to recriminalise homelessness for openly aesthetic reasons. So, again, this interest is not all new. The rhetoric and the initiatives of the city marketing company cannot serve as evidence for a brand new politics of crime prevention at the local level, as the supporters as well as the critics may argue. Instead, it needs to be placed in a context of economic restructuring where safety and cleanliness are now regarded as important place attributes of economic competition.

Among the other actors involved, the emphasis on the linkage between the local economy and ‘crime’ is not articulated and ZTP-style approaches are absent. The local police, for example, do not practise ‘tough on crime’ approaches. The Chief Constable of the Essen police is strictly opposed to strategies which ‘solve’ the drug problem around the central railway station by evicting the junkies (Schenkelberg, 2000). Among the political parties, only the (now governing) CDU is openly in favour of ‘tough on crime’ politics (Hermann, 1999, p. 62). But there is also a less repressive wing within the party. That the ‘law-and-order’ wing is not in a position to rush through with their approach can be seen by the fact that the proposal for a new ‘by-law to maintain the public security and order’, which would criminalise various activities and effectively social groups, has recently been halted.

But then again, the diverse working groups do have practical outcomes. The above-mentioned task force dealing with the illegal open-air ‘drug market’ at the central railway station, for example, has, after heated discussion and several meetings, developed a plan. Accompanied by extensive social work and offers of drug treatment, the scene will finally be cleared under the slogan
‘repression and help’—in that order (Beuscher, 2001). Another example is provided by the eviction orders for drug-users and dealers from the central railway station for a longer period of time, which were enforced before the new plan for eviction was put in place. These people are issued with a map showing the area that they are no longer allowed to enter because they have been identified as members of the ‘open-air drug scene’. Here, the police, who first arrest the person and later enforce the order, the Town Clerks’ Office, which issues it, and the state attorney, who gives the legal backing, have to work together. This kind of official assistance has been made far easier by the formal and informal connections established through various meetings and working groups. As a Town Clerks’ official told us, “Today I know all the beat officers personally. We don’t have to institutionalise everything” (interview, 2000). These informal connections make the co-operation between administrative, legal and enforcement personnel far easier.

The eviction orders are not only enforced in a purely ‘tough on crime’ manner, but also they are not applied against Essen residents—only drug-users from other cities are banned. As the same official put it, “We don’t want to interfere with the activities of the social work in that area” (interview, 2000). One visible part of this social work is the ‘mobile surgery’, a mobile doctor’s van financed by a variety of organisations and located on the square behind the railway station. So it is not about the simple clearing of the scene, as wanted by the ‘tough on crime’ faction and feared by the critics. At the ‘street level’, the strategy is not simple ‘law and order’, but a combination of the eviction of ‘travelling dealers’ and help for about 50 drug-users from Essen, who are hanging around the central railway station on any given day (depending on the weather).

Summing up the recent development of the politics of crime in Essen, three points stand out

1. The local voices calling for the eviction of undesirable people are not new, but they may be louder today.
2. Various actors are not in favour of ‘tough on crime’ strategies.
3. New informal connections make law enforcement more effective.

Although ‘crime prevention’ is linked to local economic development by various actors, and although other actors have to adapt to this new context, the practical result is not a completely new way of policing but a slight change towards more repressive approaches (see Table 1).

4. Glasgow: “Smiling on in a Friendly and Safe City Centre?”

4.1 Socioeconomic Background

The socioeconomic development of Glasgow and of its surrounding region Clydeside, was until the early 20th century closely linked to the British Empire, with wealth originating from trading overseas goods. The city rose later to its industrial heyday through shipbuilding, locomotive manufacturing and other heavy manufacturing industries. The decline of the Empire as well as the following industrial recession, only briefly interrupted by the two world wars, severely hit Glasgow’s urban economy and social structure.

The history of Glasgow’s political and economic development as part of the British industrial heartland is incomplete without acknowledgement of the importance of the city’s working class, which has always played a central and radical part in local politics, in particular during the first half of the 20th century when the city received its reputation as ‘Red Clydeside’. The working-class politics around housing provision (as in the famous rent strikes of the 1920s) and working conditions were also reflected in the organisation of local government politics. With few exceptions, the left wing of the Labour party has been in power in Glasgow since the 1920s and has imprinted its particular style of municipal socialism ‘Clyde built’
### Table 1. Recent initiatives in crime prevention, with reference to the city centre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Essen</th>
<th>In Glasgow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various steering groups, crime prevention committees to deal with open drug scene at train station and in city centre</td>
<td>Public space CCTV system CityWatch (since 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean City action days (since 1997)</td>
<td>Curfew on night-club entrance (since 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order partnerships to deal with different aspects of crime and disorder (1998)</td>
<td>Ban on drinking in public (since 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Service Team to patrol city centre, observe ‘unlawful conduct’ and inform the police (1998–2000)</td>
<td>Spotlight initiatives by police to address violent crime, disorder and the fear of crime (since 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal for a city-centre by-law on disorderly behaviour (2000)</td>
<td>City-centre representatives, to patrol city centre as tourist guides, wardens and clean-up squad (since 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Centre Partnership as umbrella organisation for all city-centre issues (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on the political landscape (MacLean, 1983; Damer, 1990). Hence, Clydeside shares with the Ruhr region a strong working-class, socialist/social democratic political tradition. Urban post-war policies were largely determined by problems of poor housing conditions for most parts of the urban working-class population. The city’s landscape witnessed large-scale housing programmes, with the demolition of inner-city slums and the emergence of housing schemes at the periphery to rehouse the urban population out of the ‘slummed’ and crowded parts of the inner city and the East End. Yet, the continuing decline of the urban economic base compromised the efforts from the early 1970s onwards. The local recession was exacerbated by the international oil crisis and subsequent turmoil in the global economy, leaving many countries, and foremost those like Britain with its economy dominated by traditional industries, in economic crisis (Allen and Massey, 1988). For Glasgow’s economy, this meant surging unemployment and large numbers of the industrial workforce confronted poverty beyond poor housing conditions. The demise of the old industrial economic base is commented on by Paddison who remarks that

Whether viewed at the European scale or nationally, Glasgow represents one of the more extreme cases of an industrial city in decline (Paddison, 1993, p. 343).

To illustrate this decline, and in more recent years the failure of recovery, the employment rate of the city of Glasgow is an adequate, though rarely used, indicator. This is unfortunate in terms of comparability with Essen, where the unemployment rate is used, but necessarily so for definitional reasons. In terms of unemployment, the UK—and Glasgow, for that matter—has been subjected to numerous redefinitions since the Conservatives gained power in 1979 and introduced the claimant count, based only on those who claim unemployment-related benefits (thereby omitting people who under the ILO definition are willing to work and seeking work). However, even the European-wide accepted ILO count poses difficulties, since in the UK the average unemployment rate is, at 6 per cent, relatively low in comparison with the rest of Europe and specifically with Germany (just under 12 per cent). Looking at the percentage of people who are on illness-related benefits, one finds that in the UK, and even more so in its old industrial cities, this adds another 8 per cent to the unemployment
The argument made here is that the number of men receiving sickness-related benefits has risen drastically over the past 20 years in the UK. Fothergill (2001, p. 243) points out the correlation between the distribution of job losses due to the restructuring of old industrial regions and the rise of sickness in men, and estimates the level of hidden male unemployment to be around 750,000 for the UK. The job loss in those regions disproportionately affected older, unskilled and less healthy men. By means of the benefits system and employment services, these men were then diverted into sickness-related benefits rather than unemployment benefits (Beatty et al., 2000; see also Webster, 2001). For Glasgow, the rate of people receiving incapacity benefits was as high as 16.2 per cent in August 1999 (ONS, 2001). In contrast to this, by following the percentage of people in employment over a 30-years time series, the extent of industrial decline and the consequences can be assessed without having to rely on changing definitions (see Figure 2). Here, the strong overall decline in the male employment rate, which in the early 1970s was at a similar level as the overall Scottish and British ones, and also the subsequent failure to attain any recovery both display the sustained problems of economic restructuring in the city. Employment by industry tells a more frequently heard story about decline in manufacturing from more than 105,000 in 1978 to just over 30,000 by 1999 and a (slight) rise in the service industries for the same period from 255,000 to just over 290,000.

4.2 New Urban Politics and Image
Glasgow’s Labour-governed local authority was one of the first in Britain to adopt strate-
gies of local economic development. After Labour had lost the 1977 Glasgow District Council election for the first time since the 1920s and only regained power in 1980, this response was considered. As described by the then Head of the Regeneration Unit of Glasgow City Council

For the first time, in the 1980s, the Council took a decision that the top political issues to be faced in the city were about employment/unemployment and poverty and not housing. It began to adopt a new policy and established an Economic Policy Unit in the Planning Department and it developed a policy of economic change in the city. It focused on the redevelopment of the city centre, investing in the service sector (interview, 1999).

With the aid of Glasgow Development Agency (GDA, and previously Glasgow Action), the local economic development quango established under the Conservative national governments, Glasgow District Council became the lead agent of local economic development.

The image campaigns that Glasgow subsequently embarked upon have been hailed internationally as a story of ‘the ugly duckling turning into the white swan’, and are frequently cited as a success story to free one’s city of unwanted associations with poverty, violence, dirt and the general downtrodden flavour of a, now outdated, old industrial past (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Holcomb, 1994). “Glasgow’s miles better” was the first campaign, being started in 1984, followed by “Glasgow the friendly city”. The image tackled by these campaigns has been captured by Pacione (1982), who studied the image of Glasgow as viewed by London civil servants as an amalgamation of unemployment, slums, depression, housing estates, working class, violence, aggression and poverty. Accompanying these image campaigns were strategies to develop a tourist industry, focused around conference tourism, to strengthen the retail base of the city (centre) as well as attracting inward investment for new service-sector industries. In the process, Glasgow has witnessed inward investment into leisure, retail and service-sector industries. In particular, attracting call centres to the city has been heralded as a viable economic growth strategy by the local economic development agents. Tracing private-sector investment between 1998 and 2000, the bulk was channelled into hotel leisure, retail and office developments. Private-sector investment, as traced through completed developments in that period, totalled £941.7 million, of which the retail sector accounted for £460.6 million and industrial investment for less than one-tenth of this figure. However, the figures for the retail sector are unlikely to be maintained in future, since 1999 saw the opening of the Buchanan Galleries, Scotland’s largest shopping centre; and so, with the parallel opening of Braehead Shopping Centre in the periphery, two large-scale projects have now been completed (Murray, 2001).

The key agents of this economic development are still the Council and Scottish Enterprise Glasgow (previously GDA), which both work through various committees and partnerships to call upon private-sector agents. ‘Getting the message out there’ has been and still is a key issue of economic regeneration: it reflects the impression that things are changing, that poverty and dereliction are not so much problems of the present but of the past and that the measures taken work. Still, the past keeps haunting the present through outside image problems, as mirrored in the joint economic strategy published by Glasgow Alliance, Glasgow City Council and the GDA (1999).

The weaknesses [of Glasgow] were mainly familiar. The cycle of deprivation was widely recognised as an unacceptable waste of life chances. The environment in older industrial areas was regularly criticised as a brake on development. … The external image—low visibility and the remains of the ‘hard’ reputation. … Surveys repeatedly show that Glaswegians recognise a strong ‘buzz’ in their city and regularly show a stronger commitment to their
city than city residents elsewhere but outside Glasgow, this image is not strongly shared. Can Glasgow build a distinctive image that will help to attract more visitors and investment? (Glasgow Alliance et al., 1999, p. 20).

Yet, given the limited extent to which entrepreneurial activities figure in financial terms, it is useful to recall Boyle and Hughes’ (1994) argument about urban entrepreneurialism in Glasgow relating to its designation as the European Capital of Culture, 1990. They found that urban entrepreneurialism in terms of financial budgeting for marketing and image purposes, as well as direct local economic activity undertaken by the local authority, only took up a relatively small part of the annual council budget. In the period between 1981 and 1992, it only accounted for 0.7 per cent or £4.6 million of total Council expenditure (Boyle and Hughes, 1994, p. 459). The money spent through the Development and Regeneration Committee rose to 2.6 per cent or £26.2 million for the Council budget of 2001. In a similar vein, Booth and Boyle comment on the frequent references to local economic development during the Year of Culture, but note that

There were few tangible policies, and fewer projects that linked job creation or training to the very successful programme of events mounted in 1990 (Booth and Boyle, 1993, p. 45).

In this sense, Jessop’s (1997) claim—namely, that entrepreneurial urbanism is at least as much about the creation of a new discursive frame in which the restructuring of capital is placed as it is a new form of grounded urban politics—does offer insights into just how important is the embedding of particular narratives to the pursuit of economic development. In a way, much of the entrepreneurial city is certainly ‘spin’ and, while one listens to the apparent success stories of Glasgow’s economy, the obvious problems of its current political economy are staring one in the face: low capital investment rates, high persistent unemployment, falling tax-base and so on (see Figure 2; Glasgow Alliance et al., 1999).

4.3 Politics of Crime

As in Essen, various new local initiatives in the field of the politics of crime have been established over the past decade in Glasgow. Three of them seem to be of particular importance to research questions concerning the interplay between the politics of crime and urban entrepreneurialism: the local CCTV system CityWatch, Strathclyde Police Force’s Spotlight Initiative and the City Centre Representatives.

As already laid out, Glasgow’s urban governance has witnessed over the past 15–20 years many attempts at reorganisation to respond institutionally to the demands of urban regeneration. Almost symptomatic is the continuous renaming and reorganisation of various departments within the Glasgow City Council. These shifting emphases on different aspects of partnership working are also mirrored in the new integration of crime prevention strategies and in the way these are institutionally organised. One of the most recent examples is the Community Safety Partnership (Glasgow Community Safety Partnership 2000) which oversees various community safety forums and now operates from within the Council. With its establishment, Glasgow meets the Scottish Executive guidelines that each local authority is encouraged to form a local community safety partnership (Scottish Executive, 1999). Such examples of reorganisation indicate the move of community safety or, more classically, of crime prevention measures into local government bodies and outwith the police.

Reflecting their high involvement in economic regeneration, the GDA also proved central to efforts at establishing the city-centre CCTV scheme in Glasgow. The reasoning for the scheme lay in linking an attractive city centre and a positive image closely to issues of safety, fear of crime and crime itself. The central link can be paraphrased as
‘feeling good in a safe environment entices people to stay and stay longer and spend more money, i.e. is economically desirable’ (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Short and Ditton, 1995; Helms, 2001).

CityWatch was one of the first large-scale projects in the UK which explicitly addressed the need for a safe city centre for good business. Being initiated by as well as, in the beginning at least, being largely funded by the GDA, the system was regarded as an integrative crime prevention and detection initiative but was also concerned with addressing the environmental effects of crime, such as vandalism and graffiti. The involvement of GDA reflected an increasing awareness among public-sector agencies of the link between environmental quality, personal safety, and economic development. Each of these factors are important contributors to the attractiveness of cities as places to live, work, visit and do business (EKOS, 1997, p. 8).

Having constructed this connection between economic prosperity and quality-of-life offences, a range of situational crime prevention measures were introduced alongside the CCTV system: curfews to regulate users’ presence outside pubs and clubs and to police the ‘lager louts’ more efficiently as well as a local by-law to ban drinking in public spaces across the city, were introduced between 1994 and 1996 (see Table 1).

By the end of the 1990s, crime prevention initiatives became combined, together with other city-centre management issues, under the umbrella of the City Centre Partnership (CCP), established in 1999. The CCP is a town centre management body set up predominantly from within the Council to improve communication between businesses and council services in the city centre and also to manage and, similarly important, to market the city centre. Managing not only the CityWatch scheme, but also coordinating the removal of graffiti and fly-posting, the City Centre Partnership also lobbies increasingly for a tighter regulation of the selling of the homeless magazine *The Big Issue*. It attempted to introduce a limited number of stalls to sell the magazine within the city centre and also to promote the introduction of by-laws to ban begging in the city centre (Laing, 2000; personal communication). Returning to the quote in this article’s introduction, begging and supposedly aggressive begging again became a heated issue for Glasgow when in Spring 2001 the Lockwood Report on city-centre retailing claimed that aggressive begging acted as brake on Glasgow’s economic success (Lockwood, 2001).

The CCP also co-ordinates various forums on city-centre issues and is actively involved in the Central and West Community Safety Forum, another steering-group which, located within the council, consists of the ‘usual suspects’ and tackles area-based crime hot spots through partnership working. Although still dominated by the police, the community safety forum is officially led by the respective Councillors for the city centre. Through the involvement of the CCP, private-sector interests give strategic input, as also, if less frequently, do the statutory social work sections of the council and the voluntary sector. Both of the latter have a very low key ‘discursive presence’ with respect to the community safety/city-centre attractiveness nexus. In the activities pursued by the CCP, they are largely absent, or are marked by stark disagreements. However, at the street level, a different picture appears, since the Street Liaison Group of the police, especially established for street prostitution and homelessness, is welcomed by most organisations working in the field. These organisations suggest and accept that the police (and this even applies to the ordinary beat officer, not only to the Street Liaison Team) can be just as street-wise as outreach workers, know what is going on and how initiatives can be put into perspective. The consensus for this lies largely in the acceptance that drug-dealing in the city centre is the biggest problem—something which is, according to many of the outreach workers, unacknowledged by the CCP, who falsely concentrate on begging and *The Big Issue* selling rather than con-
structively tackling the real problems. Or, as a senior employee of The Big Issue put it:

The only thing that has happened … we tried to say to them there are constructive ways to tackle things like begging and … their City Centre Partnership just shoved people out. If you can’t see the begging, then the homelessness doesn’t exist. What they haven’t realised is that the drug problems are getting really bad in Glasgow and that everybody … everybody knew that it was bad but the situation in the city centre is becoming worse … it is becoming worse because of their blinkered approach to it (interview, 2000).

Next to the extended partnership working on concerns of community safety, the Strathclyde Police has been pursuing for a number of years their high visibility, and certainly high publicity, campaign, the Initiative Spotlight

to reduce violent crime, disorder and the fear of crime…. Spotlight is a long term initiative taking a fresh look at those forms of crime which the public have identified as being of concern to them (Strathclyde Police Force, 2001).

Targeting those crimes that the public is ostensibly most concerned with, like drinking in public, dirt and litter, public nuisances and the like, the emphasis of this strategy rests on the public’s fear of crime and parallels zero tolerance concerns with ‘broken windows’, general signs of neglect and decay and the public’s supposed dislike of these problems.

A third approach to community safety, although firmly framed within the tourist industry, is worth highlighting. Like many other cities in the UK, Glasgow possesses a city-centre warden project, the City Centre Representatives. Providing an information service for tourists and other users of the city centre alike, the Representatives also fill an important gap of policing or, more appropriately named, regulating communication between various council service departments, the businesses in the city centre as well as emergency services. By doing so, they fulfil functions which previously were performed by the ‘bobby on the beat’: a uniformed presence who offers advice and help in case of small-scale problems such as lost children and people needing advice or first aid. The City Centre Representatives is a project which tries to turn around the city’s ‘hard’ image. Acting as a service-sector training programme for long-term unemployed Glaswegians, it provides the ‘ambassadors’ of Glasgow—friendly locals who are “an extra pair of eyes and ears on the street”, as described by one council official. It thereby serves as an integrative approach in dealing with image problems and city-centre security when aiming to provide an attractive and safe city centre, enjoyable for tourists, locals and retailers (Helms, 2001).

Before moving on to the discussion, some of the developments in Glasgow will now be highlighted:

(1) It is undisputed that the old industrial past continues to pose problems such as poverty, unemployment and a poor external image.

(2) However, across the city centre, different interest-groups operate within different alliances—such as the homeless organisation, and their good relations with the Police Street Liaison Team—whereas the city-centre marketing and management organisation, the City Centre Partnership, possesses close links to Community Safety agencies within the police and those which are part of public–private partnership working.

(3) For the latter, the need for crime reduction and crime prevention measures is undisputed. ZTP and the rigorous policing of low-level offences which are closely linked to aesthetic measures play an important role in achieving crime prevention goals.

The politics of crime as pursued by the agents around the City Centre Partnerships are the ones which frequently surface in the public discourse, also they are highly visible in the city-centre spaces. This high visibility
allows these agents to place crime prevention, and their method of choice, ZTP, effectively on the agenda and thereby significantly influence the measures taken and strategies pursued.

5. Conclusion

Drawing together the particular politics of crime in the two cities, attention should be drawn to the biggest commonality between Glasgow and Essen, which may be called a 'shift in the consensus' towards more law and order.

In both cities, an abundance of different management groups, steering groups and committees exist. Some of them do not influence much of what is happening, but then again things are changing. The examples of Glasgow’s City Centre Partnership as an umbrella organisation, as well as the establishment of a working relation between the police and the Town Clerks’ Office in Essen, indicate that the well-established interest-groups (with the local authorities at the forefront) continue to organise and to orchestrate these strategies. This being said, co-operation with other actors such as the police and retailers sometimes takes on new forms of partnership working.

This happens against the discursive backdrop of law-and-order polemics. Zero tolerance and various related synonyms are present in public discourses and usually hailed as success stories. The frameworks for urban politics in this field are the legislation and ideologies produced at the scale of the nation-state, where, in both Germany and Britain, significant changes can be observed. The dominant end towards which (urban) ‘crime’ and law enforcement are discursively placed on the agenda has changed. Whereas the end during the Fordist regime of accumulation used to be the ‘disciplining of individuals’, it is nowadays arguably the ‘management of groups’ and the ‘control of spaces’ (Johnston, 2000; Lyon, 2001). This is manifested by various changes in the fields of legislation and ideology production which can be studied in all Western countries.

Every actor participating in the discourse has to take that change into account and bring his/her interest forward in a manner that makes it conformable, when, for example, participating in fora, round tables or partnerships on city-centre issues.

Within this context, the (older) interests of using ‘safety’ and ‘cleanliness’ as means of competition at the urban scale are now in a stronger position. On the other hand, the interests connected with the disciplinary aim (welfare, social work, rehabilitation and, briefly, help) are in a weaker position, as in particular the debates around the central train station in Essen have shown. Although the ‘getting tough on crime’ ideologies are not enacted all the way through, it is now commonly accepted by policy-makers that a dirty and unsafe city centre is bad for business and that those people who are perceived to make it dirty and unsafe have to be dealt with accordingly.

What many of the measures applied both in Essen and Glasgow have in common is that they have little to do with what is usually referred to as ‘serious crime’. If the problem really was ‘crime’ (or related, ‘drugs’), then the reasons for lawbreaking (or using illegal substances) would have to be addressed, which does not happen by removing or filming people. The measures themselves give a hint of the real purpose behind their application. What they do is to evict certain undesirable people and groups from certain city-centre spaces, and what really happens is that the visibility of economic and social problems is removed (Breyvogel, 1998a): thus, the measures are basically aesthetic measures (Mitchell, 1997; Belina, 2000). The whole approach is ideological as it arguably addresses problems of crime and fear of crime, and in fact serves the purpose of an aesthetic upgrading of city centres. It is not about ‘crime’, but about city spaces that are supposed to function as exploitable resources in interurban competition (and also in competition with the suburbs). In this line of argument, crime prevention and policing are not the foundation of the enacted policies; nor are the causes of crime dealt with, and
nor are people to be rehabilitated. Instead, the upgrading and the promotion of city centres is the base for the pursued policies.

Zero-tolerance policing turns out to be a moment of urban entrepreneurialism, designed to serve as a means of fostering and pursuing interurban competition by making a safe, and perceived to be safe, city centre more attractive to consumers. This process is facilitated through integrating the politics of crime into the heart of the entrepreneurial city discourse and practice (Jessop, 1997). Local marketing and economic development agents, in particular, intervene strategically in the discourse by bringing in quality-of-life offences and ZTP as a solution. In so doing, they employ notions of a revanchist city in Smith’s (1996) sense. MacLeod (2002) has recently employed and reworked Smith’s concept in relation to the city of Glasgow and its urban renaissance where he contends that

Certainly the evidence from Glasgow would appear to support the argument that, in the wake of the sociospatial selectivities inscribed into an entrepreneurial mode of governance, and amid the tight political grip of a ‘rolled out’ neoliberalism, the political-geographical contours of revanchism—fiscal retrenchment, interdictory architectures and authoritarian state tactics—are being ‘naturalized’ within the urban political arena (MacLeod, 2002, p. 617).

In this process, the agents who draw on the discourse of ‘crime’ to call for measures to ‘clean up’ the city centres are in a stronger position today than they were 20 years ago in Germany as well as in the UK. Therefore, on the discursive as well as on the practical level, a move towards more ‘law and order’ took place and still takes place (with all the critical implications that this possesses). However, with MacLeod (2002), it is important to point out the dangers of taking the presence of entrepreneurial as well as revanchist modes of urban governance as either completely novel or, similarly, as entirely cohesive and coherent. Furthermore, the reality of law enforcement and repression is neither all that new, nor all that all-pervasive, as many critics (who focus on the discursive level only) would have us believe.

This article has drawn on two detailed case studies examining the discursive and practical linkages employed by agents of crime control and economic development and marketing between these two fields. These empirical studies caution us to talk about coherent and all-encompassing projects—as, for example, in the case of Glasgow’s City Centre Partnership vis-à-vis the Police’s Street Liaison Team approach to homelessness highlights. Boyle (1999) points out in relation to the urban entrepreneurialism literature that the consumption of boosterist hallmark events has not been researched in detail but is generally assumed to function in a straightforward way. In addition to this, it may be concluded that as—this article has tried to show—the enactment and implementation of ZTP as part of an entrepreneurial mode of governance similarly requires careful attention and study.11

Notes
1. This takes sometimes absurd forms. “Zero tolerance for blonde rubber-doll” was the title of a note in the Süddeutsche Zeitung (11 August 2000) about a man, who got arrested for pumping up his sex-toy in public.
2. In the academic context, the supporters of ZTP (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Ellickson, 1996) present a minority. The vast majority of authors is critical of ZTP, either questioning if the strategy ‘works’ (Greene, 1999; Hess, 1996; Hermann and Laue, 2001) or criticising it as an assault on civil liberties (Ronneberger et al., 1999; Hecker, 1997; Ortner et al., 1998; Volkmann, 1999; Walter, 1998).
3. The empirical research for the paper consists of a set of interviews with relevant agents of city-centre development and crime policies in Essen in September 2000, jointly conducted by the two authors, as well as the empirical research for Helms’ degree dissertation (Helms, 2001) in Glasgow during 1999, based on semi-structured interviews and document analysis.
4. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, unemployment was practically unheard of. That is why
Jürgen Fohrmann, the protagonist in the most important piece of German post-war working-class literature, first published in 1963, says “You don’t get unemployed in the Ruhr region. There is always work” (von der Grün, 1980, p. 73).

5. According to a statement by the chief of the Essen police (Schenkelberg, 2000), 7.5 per cent of the statistically registered offences in Essen in 1999 occurred around the central railway station. But among these 4258 offences, possession of illegal substances accounted for 36 per cent, travelling without a ticket for 18 per cent and pick-pocketing for another 17.5 per cent. “As far as violent crime such as robbery or bodily harm is concerned, the majority of the victims are to be found among the homeless persons and the drug scene” (Schenkelberg, 2000, p. 1; emphasis in the original). Altogether, the official figures do not confirm the public perception that the central railway station is a dangerous place in the sense that innocent passers-by are likely to become victims of any serious crime.

6. This measure as been applied to ‘break up open-air drug scenes’ in German cities since the early 1990s (Belina, 2000; Roggan, 2000, p. 201; Krasemann and de Marinis, 1997).

7. The open-air scene is only a small part of the estimated 3500–5000 people using illegal drugs regularly in Essen (Schenkelberg, 2000, p. 2).

8. All figures are for 1999. There is a much broader argument to be made here, in so far as unemployment figures—such as the ILO or the British Labour Force Survey—smooth out real unemployment, especially in regions of economic decline by omitting ‘want-to-work’ figures which do not appear in any statistic but are as high as one-third of the economically inactive population. The authors are indebted to David Webster, Glasgow City Housing, for pointing out these intricacies of employment statistics.

9. Criminal justice is a devolved matter in the UK and hence falls under the remit of the Scottish Parliament and, thus, the legal requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) for England and Wales, which make Community Safety Partnerships mandatory, do not apply to Scotland. Scotland currently possesses guidelines about this issue which are not legally binding.

10. For a more detailed discussion on the installation of the system, see Fyfe on Bannister, 1996.

11. Further theoretical discussion about the relation of this research to urban governance will be discussed in the authors’ PhD theses.

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