Matters of Life and Death

Existential Problems and the Limits of Law

**Symposium convened by Endre Dányi, Martina Kolanoski and Thomas Scheffer,
to be held on 2-4 July 2018 at the Department of Sociology,
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main**

Short description

We are witnessing a renewed urgency of dealing with 'existential problems' – problems that are reducible neither to 'ordinary problems' modern institutions were developed to handle, nor to 'crises' that signal extraordinary failures of those institutions. The first tenet of this symposium is that existential problems, such as climate change, are ***matters of life and death***: they challenge ways of life, but they do so in a distributed manner. In this sense, they are both ordinary and extraordinary, potentially anti-democratic, urgent, collectivist, globally interwoven, inter-dependent and recursive. As such, they call for totalizing societal mobilizations and, by doing so, tend to weaken functional differentiation and institutional divisions of labour. In the symposium, we engage with existential challenges in a problem-focused and practice-oriented manner.

More specifically, we examine how – depending on our theoretical vocabularies – collectives, social systems, members, institutions, and state apparatuses perform, frame, deny, and scale up/down existential problems. In other words, how life and death come to matter and are being appropriated. The second tenet is that ***law and legal modes of doing*** play a central role in such problem-solution-combinations. They do so, for instance, by offering a horizon for possible solutions, as liberal scholars have suggested, or by constraining (causes of) problem-solving capacities, like Marxist, feminist and anarchist thinkers have proposed.

In light of existential problems, we ask how legislation or law enforcement restrict or prescribe problem-solving efforts. The symposium will take place on **2-4 July 2018** at the Westend Campus and the Goethe University's Guesthouse (Fraunlobstraße 1, about a 15 minute walk from the Westend Campus) – see a list of participants, a tentative programme, and the presentation abstracts below.

List of participants

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Tentative programme

Monday, 2 July 2018 (Westend Campus)

16:00 – 18:00	Pre-symposium workshop with Victor Toom, Westend Campus
18:30 –	Dinner at Demera (http://www.demera-frankfurt.com/)

Tuesday, 3 July 2018 (Guesthouse, Frauenlobstraße 1)

10:00 – 12:00	Session 1: Lucy Suchman and Niels van Dijk
12:00 – 13:30	Lunch break
13:30 – 15:30	Session 2: Alain Pottage and Andreas Folkers
15:30 – 16:00	Coffee break
16:00 – 18:00	Session 3: Hannah Meszaros Martin and Michael Mair et al.

Wednesday, 4 July 2018 (Guesthouse, Frauenlobstraße 1)

10:00 – 12:00	Session 4: Sven Opitz and Endre Dányi
12:00 – 13:30	Lunch break
13:30 – 15:30	Session 5: Thomas Scheffer and Amade M'charek
15:30 – 16:00	Coffee break
16:00 – 18:00	Session 6: Victor Toom and Bernard Keenan

List of abstracts

Soluble substances, insoluble problems

Endre Dányi, Department of Sociology Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

A central promise of liberal democracy as a model of governance is that it can solve any problem relevant for a political community – primarily through legislative means. While this promise has received plenty of criticism on both technical and political grounds, the 'solubility' of problems has rarely been questioned in a democratic context. Drawing on preliminary empirical material, this paper focuses on drugs, and examines 'medicalisation', 'legalisation' and 'harm reduction' as three distinct strategies for dealing with drug use as an insoluble problem.

First, the paper revisits the 'War on Drugs' as a radical attempt to solve drug use through criminalisation, amounting to 'the greatest policy failure of the 20th century'. It then turns attention to the rise of medicalisation as an alternative to criminalisation. Through the UN World Drug Report, it examines the role statistics and other epidemiological methods play in constituting drug use as a threat to both individual and collective health. While medicalisation focuses primarily on the distinction between users and non-users, another strategy – legalisation – aims to deal with drug use through a distinction between more and less harmful substances. As the legalisation of marijuana in several states in North America and Europe show, the declassification of less harmful substances does not necessarily mean depoliticization; it means that the politics of use becomes closely intertwined with market mechanisms. Although more harmful substances remain illegal all over the world, their status and effect depend largely on how well they are known. Harm reduction programmes in various cities in North America and Europe have been good at helping users develop better ways of living with such well-known drugs as heroin. At the same time, in cities where well-known drugs are more difficult to come by, New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) have generated serious challenges of defining 'harm' – for both users and social workers.

These three strategies operate along different axes: medicalisation distinguishes between users and non-users, legalisation distinguishes between legal and illegal substances, harm reduction programmes distinguish between better and worse configurations of drug use. From a legislative perspective, all three strategies are almost entirely invisible. However, the paper concludes by arguing that it would be a mistake to equate their invisibility with a lack of democratic politics. On the contrary, these strategies – and material practices associated with them – sensitise us to a democratic politics that engage with problems in terms other than solutions.

The ecological nomos of the Earth. Planetary Stewardship, Air-appropriation and resistance against the Anthropocene

Andreas Folkers, Max Weber Kolleg, Erfurt University

Complex ecological crisis phenomena like climate change and the sixth extinction arguably represent the paradigmatic existential problems of the present. Not only do they threaten the very existence of human and non-human life-forms and are therefore matters of life and death. The also severely challenge the capacities of existing apparatuses of government to adequately address these issues. The talk looks at contemporary bio-political frameworks like planetary stewardship and earth system governance to show how environmental and policy experts envision a coherent political response to existential ecological problems. The talk will champion the thesis that these frameworks tacitly introduce a new spatial-political ontology, an entirely new topology of power. The talk will contrast the current problematization of planetary boundaries in earth system science with the description of the modern colonial world order by Carl Schmitt to argue that we are witnessing the emergence of an entirely new nomos of the earth which I will call the ecological nomos of the earth.

In contrast to the geopolitical world order Schmitt described the eco-political Earth is not the globe of the circumnavigators and colonizers. No telescope and no world map can render it visible properly. Rather space travel, a planetary sensory infrastructure and climate models, what Paul Edwards calls the "vast machine" of climate science, paved the way for this new experience on earth. The ecological earth is no longer just an extended horizontal surface, but a voluminous and vertical body. The essential spatial units are no longer territory and colony, but an interdependent complex of world-spanning spheres: the hydro, geo, atmo- and biosphere. Yet, despite this plurality of intersecting spheres earth systems science still apprehends the earth as a singular whole, as "one single, complex, dissipative, dynamic entity far from thermodynamic equilibrium – the 'Earth System'" (Schellnhuber 1999, C20).

After having introduced the contours of this ecological nomos the second part of the talk thinks about the possibilities for resistance within and against this new political ontology. I will introduce the notion of Air-appropriation (Luftnahme) to highlight the colonial legacies of the current ecological world order and will reflect on the temporality and historicity of the atmosphere as a global common and an earth historical archive that stores the traces of human action and socio-economic injustices as carbon footprints. Finally, I will confront the one world view of planetary stewardship with the attempts by social movements and climate justice activists to take into account the one, too, many worlds that inhabit the planetary present.

Dangerous information: Closed Material within the British legal system

Bernard Keenan, Department of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London

In the 1996 case of Chahal v UK, the ECtHR determined that national security concerns cannot outweigh the prohibition on refoulement where deportation would expose a subject to torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Furthermore, where a deportee claims that their removal would lead to such treatment, a court must be able to determine their appeal. Because the state frequently relies on classified information in such matters, a semi-closed procedure was suggested by the Court by which some information could be presented by the state without being disclosed to the appellant or the public. Parliament passed the SIAC Act 1997 to institute this suggestion.

Since 11th September 2001, SIAC has been the medium through which controversial counter-terrorism administrative measures have been legitimated, via SIAC's symbolic offer of judicial review. The indefinite detention of certified 'foreign terrorists' gave way to Control Orders, i.e. intensive surveillance and house-arrest; more recently, that strategy has been replaced by stripping nationality from those who have gone overseas, rendering them vulnerable to assassination. Less dramatically, the biopolitical 'securitisation' of social life is evidenced by the fact that there are closed hearings in relation to employment law, prison law, and family law, in situations where parents are thought by social workers to be 'radicalising' their children.

The genetic model of recursive systemic closure offers a model for tracing the form through reiterated practices and mutations across different subsystems of law, as well as accounting for the intense anxiety, resistance, and dissonance it generates within the legal system itself: human rights lawyers are simultaneously outspoken against such practices yet contribute hours of energy to their propagation and refinement. Justice is said to be under threat, yet it is striking how stable SIAC remains. Such matters do not trouble the survival of the legal system itself, but with each generation of measures, procedural limits on secrecy, disclosure, and the limits of judicial incursion into security-based decision-making have been developed and refined.

The suggestion that the legal system is not incapable of reviewing decisions based on speculative risk-analysis, political interventions, and 'emergency' situations. What generates anxiety and time is the management of the distinction between closed/open, i.e., the processual self-observation of process itself. Presented in this way, one can observe how immanent practices of lawyering in a closed material setting produce and mediate global questions of biopolitical life and death.

Amade M’charek

[to be added]

Clearing the Way: Vision, Action and Legal Accountability in Combat Operations

Michael Mair (Liverpool), Chris Elsey (Leicester) & Martina Kolanoski (Frankfurt)

Since the early 2000s, a small number of videos capturing military wrongdoing have made their way into the public domain. These include cockpit footage from an attack by US aircraft on British infantry near Basra, Iraq, a German-directed bombing run on petrol tankers in Kunduz province, Afghanistan, and a series of airstrikes by US Apache helicopters that led to the deaths of journalists and other civilians in Iraq's capital Baghdad. Capturing deadly attacks by air force personnel on fellow soldiers or unarmed civilians, these videos provoked public and political outcry upon release and remain controversial today.

That these were videos and not stills, that they recorded the actions and interactions of the different air crews in the run up to the attacks over extended periods of time rather than brief segments of it and that their release was accompanied by additional contextualising materials such as the reports of military inquiries and the evidence they contained added to the significance they were accorded. Video seems to reveal what is normally concealed and what had been revealed by these videos shocked many. However, having examined these cases in depth, we want to suggest reasons for exercising caution when it comes to engaging with them. We are wary, for one thing, of operator-centrism, the privileging of the operator's, here the single pilot or crew's, viewpoints and practical involvements over others, thereby (falsely) positioning them at the centre of the action. We are also wary of camera-centrism, treating what is captured by the camera as all that could be said to be relevantly happening. These videos certainly show us things, they are evidence of something, but exactly what requires further explication.

Focusing on one example in particular, the much discussed *Collateral Murder* video, we want to think about the ways in which matters of life and death are made available and accountable in and through it. We will argue we, as observers after the fact, experience a break between our ordinary ways of seeing and the Apache crew's ways of seeing as we watch the video – we do not see things in the same way they do and that disjunction is unsettling. We want to trace that break to its locus in the Apache crew's practical orientation to the scenes they encounter, an orientation which enables them to kill as and when required. We will argue that orientation is structural not personal and will offer an analysis of the structures of collaborative action which clear the way for the use of overwhelming violence against human targets and render them killable – something we suggest we do gain at least partial access to via the video. Offering a contrast with cases of individual misconduct, specifically the Abu Ghraib torture and the Marine A execution cases, we shall suggest that part of what is so unsettling about *Collateral Murder* is that it is not an illegal individual act but a legally sanctioned corporate one. Indeed, the Apache crews' orientation to procedure and collaboration via the chain of command ensures that this is accountably so.

Ethnomethodological studies of matters of life and death in war, as this analysis will show, attend to legality as a concerted, here and now achievement and thus treat legality as a locally worked product rather than a fixed external yardstick that can be used to assess that local work. Indeed, for ethnomethodology, external assessments and uses of such yardsticks are grounded in their own forms of local and locally accountable work. At the same time, ethnomethodological studies bring out members' orientations to issues of legality and illegality as they arise in and are made relevant to particular contexts of action. Based on a consideration of both axes – the local accomplishment of legality and in situ orientations to the legal/illegal distinction – we shall argue counter-analyses of *Collateral Murder* and related cases, scholarly and legal, fail to specify the sense in which they involve wrongdoing by misreading the accountabilities of vision and action at work within them.

The Pixel and the Plot: Delineating the realm of the outlaw in low resolution

Hannah Meszaros Martin, Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths College

This paper interrogates modes of image production that are bound up with the generation of coca statistics in the context of the Colombian armed conflict. My research reveals how data and images produce criminalised landscapes – landscapes wherein whole ecologies and species groups are condemned to elimination. Since its foundation in 1997, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been generating statistics on coca cultivation in Colombia, mainly using remote sensing data from publicly available, medium-resolution LANDSAT imagery. These reports go on to inform government policies like crop eradication. When satellite images are used in the War on Drugs to identify and classify coca and other illicit crops, delineating between the legal and the illegal becomes a question of scale and resolution.

My research focuses on the systematic and legally sanctioned eradication of the coca plant in Colombia that I argue is paradigmatic of the ways in which legal reclassifications produce new objects of contestation that, in turn, produce new forms of violence. I examine how this violence is visually registered along various scales of representation, from certain practices of agriculture found in the Colombian forest, and the spaces that are subsequently produced, to UNODC coca cultivation surveys. These various spaces of agriculture, and this includes the plants within, become the images through which I read back the violence of the law. My research argues that the US-led Drug War has been an ecocidal war, operating through different forms of entangled human and nonhuman extinction. Through examining the role of these ecocidal practices – aerial fumigation included – in the context of the internal armed conflict, I articulate the deep connections between political and environmental violence.

Protocols of Pandemic Preparedness: Soft Emergency Law in the Administration of Global Health Security

Sven Opitz, Department of Sociology, Philipps Universität, Marburg

Among the existential problems of our planetary present, Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) are key in articulating a particular mode of futurity: the catastrophic threat of pandemic contagion is perceived to be both unpredictable and inevitable. Consequently, it can neither be prevented nor preempted, but only prepared for. Whereas the rationality of preparedness has been convincingly related to the governmental paradigm of "vital systems security", the accompanying political quest for "legal preparedness" has received relatively little attention. In this paper, I want to remedy this shortcoming by focusing on the particular kind of law designed to establish a state of legal preparedness. As I will demonstrate with regard to the International Health Regulations (IHR) of the WHO, we are witnessing the emergence of a global law that differs significantly from traditional liberal law. It is a form of law that is neither prescriptive in a strong normative sense, nor does it follow the modern form of "subjective rights". And although it is supposed to prepare for an "emergency of international concern" (IHR, Art. 12), it does not seek to accommodate a sovereign exception. Rather, this law of legal preparedness aims at assembling global administrative structures, enrolling heterogeneous bodies into governmental feedback mechanisms. Drawing on recent media theory, I propose to conceive of this peculiar kind of global law as "protocological law". According to Alexander Galloway, "protocol" is a management style that characterizes distributed networks. It sets standards that govern the exchange between self-determining nodes. The paper probes the hypothesis that regulations such as the IHR seek to stabilize global forms of administrative interconnectivity in order to register and an act upon contagious dynamics. These forms of global law constitute, so to speak, the code of vital systems security – and, as such, are a technology of resilience.

Fossil law: looking back on the species

Alain Pottage, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science

For those who believe that we have now entered the epoch of the Anthropocene, the most fundamental question of life and death is one that has to be posed in relation to human species as such. The question of life and death is one that engages responsibility. But if one takes the geological premise of the Anthropocene seriously, then the nature of the anthropos that is responsible for the Anthropocene will only be known at some considerable time from now, when contemporary agency has settled into the rock record. Geology is the original forensic science, but it is a kind of forensics begins with rock, and therefore, by definition, at some remove from contemporary analyses of responsibility. The human is to construed in terms of the stratigraphic trace or signal that it will be legible to future geologists. Those in charge of the Anthropocene Working Group, which is keen to press ahead with the ratification of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch, are keen to bring this future time 'back' into the present, to construct the first geological epoch that is aware of itself as such. And this implies a novel approach to the definition of the central kind of forensic artifact in geology: the fossil. From the perspective of law, this kind of anthropogeology suggests a radically different way of thinking about the nomos of the Earth. If nomos is indeed the trace, inscription, or event that inaugurates our world, then arguably the nomos of the Anthropocene is actually the fossil trace of contemporary humanity. And, paradoxically, this 'nomos' exists in the mode of the future perfect. Our nomos is what will have been for future observers, and our understanding of its agency in the present is an effect of how we anticipate that future observer. In this paper, I consider the implications of this projected nomos for our understanding of the rights and wrongs associated with the Anthropocene.

The Social Life of Existential Problems

Thomas Scheffer, Department of Sociology, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

The notion or concept of "existential problems" is best understood as a socio-cultural problem category or problem status. The "social life" of these problems refers, different from social constructivism in the sociology of social problems, to the synchronous ways of the "existing" problems' becoming, being and leaving in the various social affairs of a culture and society. The problem exists "for us" as far as we can know – and as far as we experience – its performative vigour. Meaning, we better know the existential problem, because it could seriously change our lives, if we overlooked, ignored, misconstrued, or otherwise "missed" it. A society might count as sovereign, when its' capacities work sufficiently to keep the existential problems at a distance. Such societies are often, but not always, organized as states. Problem-solving apparatuses are manifold and often no longer directly related to existential problems, such as agricultural techniques, water-supply systems, or other infrastructural devices including their deployment. Sociology, in so called "developed" regions, tended to ignore the existential character of problems and state and/or cultural apparatuses. The social life of existential problems today includes a number of peculiarities that I will refer to in the following. This is the reduced list of how "we", our collectives and us as their members are implicated by existential problems. The main and joint reference point of all existential problems is the one of total contingency: the possibility of failing or extinction as a collective life-form or even society, which contradicts in very fundamental ways our social intuition that we live in, what Garfinkel called "the immortal society".

Controlling Arms

Lucy Suchman, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University

My contribution to the symposium explores the hopes and contradictions inherent in international institutions dedicated to the control of technologies of death and the preservation of life. My particular focus is on current initiatives to challenge the increasing automation – and imagined autonomy – of 'conventional' weapon systems. Following a report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2013 by Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, member states agreed to begin discussions on what were named 'fully autonomous weapon systems' at the UN's Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva. A coalition of civil society organisations, headed by Human Rights Watch, has participated in the CCW's preliminary series of 'informal meetings of experts,' aiming to build support for a pre-emptive ban on weapon systems in which the identification of targets and initiation of attack is put under fully automated machine control. As a minor contributor to this initiative, I presented testimony at the CCW in April of 2016 arguing for the inherent limits on algorithmic approaches to 'situational awareness,' taken in military discourses as a precondition for discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate targets, itself a prerequisite to legal killing within the frameworks of International Humanitarian Law.

As a participant in these discussions on autonomous weapon systems and arms control I find myself in the uneasy position of accepting, for the purposes of the debate, the premise that armed conflict is or even could be rationally governed by legal frameworks, in the face of overwhelming counter-evidence, both historical and contemporary. My effort to pose an irremediable obstacle to the legality of autonomous weapon systems within the military's own terms required suspension of what would otherwise be profound questions for me about those terms, particularly the assumptions that underwrite the principle of distinction in international laws of armed conflict. Further disconcertment comes from the trope of 'autonomy,' treated here as at once the litmus test of the model human subject, and that which is in danger of escaping human control. In the context of arms control, the premises of the rule of international law and the inalienability of human rights provide resources to be mobilized in an effort to interrupt the intensification of automation in war fighting. Yet it is in this context that enactments of difference are at their most lethal, in the profoundly gendered, racialized, and irremediably uncertain categories of 'us' and 'them' that govern violence in practice. This is not a contradiction to be resolved, I suggest, but a trouble with which we need to stay at the same time that we struggle to lessen its injurious consequences.

Matters of life, death and the dead

Victor Toom, Department of Sociology Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

Missing persons are an elusive category—it's not clear where missing persons are, not clear what their status is, and family and friends typically go through great lengths to find the missing. While most likely a missing person is dead, missing someone often is experienced as a matter of life and death. It is in such emotional and political contexts that programs have been developed to account for missing persons. Such programs were initially introduced in post-dictatorship Latin America and also implemented after the Bosnian War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, 1992-1995). The conflict was bitter and complex, and by the end of the war, approximately 100,000 persons were killed. Included in that number were an estimated 31,500 missing persons.

By the start of the 2000s, after several years of preparation, the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP, 1996) rolled out their mechanisms to (1) collect reference material from family members whose kin had been missing, and (2) start genetically analysing thousands of human remains recovered from mass graves. The ICMP has been very successful in identifying missing persons and reuniting families and mortal remains. The significance of acquiring corporeal certainty about someone's death and having a body to bury in accordance with religious and cultural customs and personal preferences cannot be underestimated. Despite ICMP's success in finding and identifying missing persons, their work is not ready yet. More than 9,000 individuals are still missing. Their remains may be in undiscovered mass graves or interred in a grave but under the wrong identity. In this presentation, the category of possibly wrongly identified and subsequent buried individuals is what I'm interested in. This category potentially disrupts an existential ontological status, namely knowing where your relative is buried, and facing the possibility that someone else is buried in the grave you've been visiting for over 20 years. It is in such context that I am interested in the work of undoing identifications.

Before the ICMP started their work, approximately 8,000 persons were identified and buried. Because their kin was identified and because surviving families knew where remains were, family members of those identified and buried in the 1990s did not participate in ICMP's processes—ICMP did consequently not receive genetic reference samples from those families. Currently, there are some 3,000 body bags—containing remains originating from 2.2 persons on average—in mortuaries throughout BiH. These human remains do not match DNA reference samples collected by ICMP. Very recently, the ICMP, after consulting numerous family associations in BiH, initiated a project where families of those 8,000 and in the 1990s identified and buried victims are requested to provide a DNA sample. Through this initiative, they hope to find matches between those living relatives and DNA profiles obtained from remains in the 3,000 body bags. Would they find a match, the implication is that the person's remains who'd been in a grave thought to be representing a person actually originated from somebody else. Such match thus provides a strong incentive to exhume those remains, forensically examine it, and then hopefully match with DNA reference samples of families who gave their biological material to the ICMP years ago. Being killed, identified and buried in the 1990s are really matters of *death and being dead*. But it becomes a *matter of experienced life and death* for family members once they know about possible misidentifications, or so is my working hypothesis. So maybe this is not a case of an existential problem, but instead one of existential mis- or re-identification. In the presentation I trace how law, technology, identities, bodies, life, death and kinship come to matter in these moments of mis/re-identification.

The Strange Machinations of RoboLaw. Coding robotic autonomy into law & moral autonomy into robots

Niels van Dijk, Law, Science, Technology & Society, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Robotics is an innovation sector under rapid development. Autonomous robots are envisioned to leave their traditional factory confines and enter domains like medical care, transport and warfare. Here they are expected to impact vital decision-making, including matters affecting life and death (traffic accidents, medical operations or assistance, military targets). The challenges posed by these developments have triggered several innovations of 'robo-law' at the intersections of computer science, law, ethics, forecasting and regulation, most visible in the European Parliament's recommendation on *Civil Law Rules on Robotics*. This contribution studies two such innovations. First, in the networks feeding into the EP's initiative, the supposed 'autonomy' of robots is positioned as area of problematization for the very axiologies of legal systems: the foundational distinction between legal subjects and legal objects. Arguing that a "strict differentiation between man and machine ("man-machine-dualism") is no longer acceptable", robots need to acquire the status of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations, a proposal the EP takes over. This special legal category makes it possible to bundle complex responsibilities of various actors involved in producing, programming, teaching and using robots. This case challenges the limits of the human-centric legal frameworks from the inside, by proposing to code robotic agency in the fundaments of the legal system itself. Second, the EP's recommendation is also interesting for the possibilities it excludes: tackling the responsibility problem by directly building moral reasoning and values into intelligent machines. Whereas this is still confined beyond the horizon of the legal universe, there are concerted efforts in the field of machine ethics to make this possible. Leaving science fiction, ethicists and software engineers directly work together in engineering ethical reasoning about moral principles and legal rules into the cognitive architecture of robots, *e.g.* in intelligent agents advising doctors about competing moral duties, or full autonomous moral decision-making by self-driving cars in unavoidable accidents, or drones in killing enemy combatants. These software subroutines incorporate legal rules (traffic rules, laws of war, rules of engagement) and include prioritizations about the relative worth of legal rules with overriding ethical principles. These two cases of coding moral autonomy into robots and coding robotic autonomy into law form each other's mirror-image. They orient us towards broader co-productions between practices of engineering, law and ethics in innovation governance, bringing to light certain limits from the inside and outside of the law.

Irene van Oorschot

[to be added]