We ask about the conditions behind the formalisation of state-business relations (SBRs) in Russia's authoritarian regime. We challenge the common argument that informality dominates these relations. Rather, we argue that both state and business actors are motivated for multiple reasons to formalise their cooperation. The result was unexpectedly clear: we found that 59 out of 83 regions feature surprisingly “strong" or “fairly strong" institutionalized SBRs. Therefore, our first conclusion is that there is a confirmed prevalence of agreements between state and business, as well as formalised procedures. It is notable that even many of the clearly closed regional authoritarian regimes in Russia have formalised SBRs.
Nevertheless, the rationale behind strong formalization varies across regions. The question to which we turn then was wich different configurations account for institutionalized SBRs? We apply fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA) to systematically examine SBRs across all federal reagions in Russia. Our fsQCA analysis points out four distinct configurations: (1) Monopolized economy, (2) Hegemonic Authoritarian Politics, (3) Personalist Politics, (4) Competitive Authoritarian Politics. We conlude that institutionalized SBRs are a crucial element of consolidated authoritarian rule, even in highly personalized political systems such as in Russia (for more information about the raw dataset, including all information for the outcome, different conditions, solutions and robustness checks, please see the appendix).
This prompts the question of whether formal state-business arrangements also contribute to
the advancement of “better governance." We argue that just the opposite is the case. Our
analysis show, formally institutionalized SBRs help to stabilise the “badly designed" informal
institutions, from which mainly the autocrat benefits.
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How do organised interests shape welfare state reforms? Together with B.Ebbinghaus we review various political economy approaches to explaining ongoing welfare state reforms. We also discuss the challenges of member mobilisation & influence in times of multiple crisis. Benedikt Bender is very happy to have contributed to this comprehensive Handbook. He is grateful to the editors, Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Moira Nelson, as well as to all colleagues who made this handbook possible.