Goethe-Universität — Frankfurter Seminar - Kolloquium des Instituts für Mathematik

Ginkgo Seminar

Vorkolloquium für Doktoranden, Post-Docs und interessierte Studierende

An den jeweiligen Veranstaltungstagen wird mit dem Ginkgo-Seminar (Gingko - Grundlagen, Intuition, Neugier für und auf das Kolloquium) gestartet, einer exklusiven Veranstaltung von Doktoranden für Doktoranden, Post-Docs und interessierte Studierende.

Ziel ist es, die Vorträge "aus der anderen Ecke des Instituts" für alle Interessierten zugänglicher zu machen.

Das Vorkolloquium findet immer ab 15.00 (c.t.) in Raum 711 groß vor dem jeweiligen Vortrag statt.

Frankfurter Seminar

Jul 1 2026

16:45

Franziska Jahnke

Frankfurter Seminar

Jun 17 2026

16:45

Gerhard Huisken

Frankfurter Seminar

Mai 13 2026

16:45

Peter Pfaffelhuber: Interactive Theorem proving using Lean (and applications in basic probability)

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Abstract: In recent years, formalizing mathematics using Lean as an interactive theorem prover has gained interest due to several large projects. E.g., currently, researchers work on the formalization of Fermat's Last Theorem, Carleson's Theorem from harmonic analysis, and Sphere Packing in Dimensions 8 and 24. In this talk, I will give an introduction to Lean and show what interactive theorem proving looks like for discrete probability theory. Interestingly, this sheds some light on the connection between probability spaces and random variables via category theory in action. If time allows, I will also present the formalization of some deeper results, the construction of Brownian motion.

Frankfurter Seminar

Apr 29 2026

16:45

Christian Stump

Frankfurter Seminar

Jan 28 2026

16:45

Irem Portakal: Algebraic methods for Nash equilibrium

MPI Leipzig

Abstract: The set of Nash equilibria of a finite game admits a natural description as a semi-algebraic set, that is, defined by a finite system of polynomial equalities and inequalities whose variables correspond to the mixed strategies of the players. This algebraic viewpoint oﬀers both conceptual and computational insights into the study of equilibrium.

The talk will begin with a brief introduction to the basic setup of finite games and the definiton of Nash equilibrium, emphasizing the underlying polynomial structure.

We will then discuss how this description enables the application of tools from real algebraic geometry to game theory. In particular, we will highlight classical and recent results concerning the maximal number of Nash equilibria in generic games and explore how these bounds reflect the geometry of the corresponding solution sets.