Protecting the Weak

Cornelia Storz & Heike Holbig

Political economy approaches have been criticized for their rather static perspectives which do not sufficiently allow for institutional change (Jackson, Deeg 2007; Jackson 2009, 2010). In this project, we reply to this critique, and focus on dynamic processes. Reasons for dynamics can be identified in power relations and vested interests (Acemoglu et al., 2000). State and social actors are equipped with different access to resources, different competitive positions, and different capabilities to convince others and to induce mobilization. To frame these processes better, we find the approach of Amable (2003) helpful to distinguish between dominant and peripheral blocs of actors, arguing that
institutions are less an optimal solution with certain functions than the result of negotiations between multitudes of social and state actors with different resources and capabilities. Hence, institutional change may be conceived as a result of competition and negotiation, both of which are shaped by asymmetrical power relations. Those with fewer resources and less power to convince others try to contest the established power of the dominant bloc. The negotiation of values is a central element in these processes. The arguments in these processes are, as Culpepper (2005) calls it, “ideational and rationalist”. To put it differently, the mechanism of belief-shift is grounded in the negotiation of values: such as protecting the weak.

The political economies of East Asia offer rich empirical evidence of contrasting patterns of institutional change, especially since, in East Asia, hitherto dominant blocs (e.g., state actors in the form of highly reputed bureaucracies) are contested by alternative ideologies. Some societies such as China and Korea experienced drastic changes during a rather brief period, while others like Japan have experienced a higher degree of stability (Storz et al. 2013). While the party-state in authoritarian China enjoys far greater power to direct and control civil society activities than in democracies, in recent years we can, nevertheless, find some rather far-reaching mobilization and institutionalization,
as, for example, in the area of animal protection. This suggests that, at least in certain areas, peripheral blocs have been successful in re-negotiating the state’s definition of the common good and thus its claim to legitimacy. In contrast, to date, it seems that the contestation of institutions which protect the weak in Japan is very much controlled by the administrative bureaucracy, for example, in its resistance to considering peripheral social actors against nuclear power in their decision processes. This background study will analyze mechanisms and processes that induce or inhibit institutional change in both countries, and search for a better understanding of the ideational and rationalist
justifications in contesting established institutions or demanding new institutions.